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Abstract
Privatization is a popular topic in many countries. However, the more a country needs
development, efficiency and the proceeds of the sales, the more difficult privatization will be. This
can result in a long period of privatization in developing countries. But when privatization takes a
long time, the vitality of companies may reduce. In this paper we present the case of the
manufacturing industries in Eritrea, where privatization has been slow. After the privatization
announcement the companies deteriorated quickly with respect to operations, investments and
finance. This makes it even more difficult to sell the companies and the implied vicious circle
results into a 'privatization trap'.
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1. Introduction
The 'poverty trap' is a well-established phenomenon.
“Poverty itself generally breeds poverty. Once the poor get poor, they tend to stay
that way.… The poor man has no capital, human or physical, to improve his lot. He
is malnourished and therefore diseased, and so his labour is less productive-but he
cannot make it more productive as he lacks money to invest in improving his land or
his tools. Therefore, he stays poor and because he is poor, is less able to organise
with others of his kind to improve their lot. If he finds himself in a situation of
competition with the rich, he will probably get even poorer.… Poverty is self-
perpetuating.” Weisband [1989, p. 37].
One of the emerging options to escape from the poverty trap for developing
countries might be privatization. Privatization is sought for a multitude of reasons [United
Nations Industrial Development Organization, 1996; Megginson and Netter, 2000], but
trying to increase the economic efficiency within the country and within the companies to
be privatized is a major issue. Moreover, privatization is frequently propagated when bad
economic conditions, high foreign debt, high dependence on international agencies and
budget deficits prevail [Ariyo and Jerome, 1999; Ramamurti, 1992; Yarrow, 1999]. Such
economic circumstances may make privatization urgent.
In general, urgency is high in developing countries, and many of these countries
started privatization programs. However, a weak regulatory framework, an ineffective
private sector, a low level of domestic income and savings and the absence of adequate
capital and stock markets constrain the success of privatization [Gordon, 1996;
Schneider, 1999; Ariyo and Jerome, 1999]. It might then be difficult to use the solution of
privatization in the developing countries. Moreover, the underdeveloped infrastructure
and environment does not add to the value of the enterprises and their attractiveness.
Potential buyers will only pay small amounts of money, unless they are allowed to3
restructure the companies and to lay-off workers. Governments, however, hesitate to give
carte blanche to a buyer, because restructuring may imply asset stripping and that reduces
the value of the company to the country. Moreover, the firing of employees generates
unemployment and the larger the company, the more the governments will restrict future
buyers.
Sometimes even profitable companies cannot be sold easily in developing
countries. When the domestic financial market cannot provide the finance of buying a
large profitable company, foreign investors might be approached. Foreign investors,
however, discount the value of a company, because in the beginning they will not be as
adequate as local investors in running the company and in using the local business
networks and regulations. While a foreign investor may not want to pay the local value of
a profitable company, governments may feel pressure not to sell profitable companies
cheaply. In that case the search for the highest bidder for a profitable company will take
time.
In Eritrea the aforementioned environment and the conflicts of interest between
potential buyers and the government slowed the pace of privatization and both profitable
and unprofitable companies listed for privatization became stuck in a long privatization
period. This made it possible to study companies during the process of privatization.
Because slow privatization is not yet studied in depth at the level of the firm one may
learn what aspects are relevant for a company during a long privatization period in a
developing country.
This article presents background literature on privatization in section 2. Section 3
gives an overview of the methodology used. The Eritrean privatization policy and the
direct privatization results are shown in section 4. Section 5 compares the development of
the state-owned companies with the development of the private companies in Eritrea
before and after the privatization announcement. Section 6 gives information on the
financial developments within three industries in Eritrea before and after that4
announcement. Section 7 gives the opinion of managers on privatization and section 8
concludes the article.
2. Impact and Speed of Privatization
The concept of privatization can have various meanings [Starr, 1988], but in most
economic literature the word "privatization" generally implies a shift of ownership of
companies from the state to the private sector. The intended shift of ownership stems
from a multitude of reasons [United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 1996;
Megginson and Netter, 2000], but two major general economic reasons are the endeavor
to create a more efficient economy as well as the need to alleviate governmental
budgetary problems. The transfer of ownership changes the aims of the firm from the
'public interest' to 'value maximizing' and it will change the relation between managers
and owners. The question then arises how the change of ownership influences the
performance of enterprises and whether companies should be publicly or privately
owned.
Berle and Means [1932] already stressed the relevance of ownership and control
implying that the maximization of value to the owner is no longer guaranteed with diffuse
ownership. Firms with concentrated ownership would be valued higher because there are
more incentives on the part of owners to monitor the firm and to make the necessary
changes [Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994; Denis
and Denis 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. Within these views private ownership
concentrates power and public ownership dilutes it, because the inhabitants of a country
only have inefficient political systems to create adequate control. In developing countries
with very inefficient political systems the situation could even be worse and badly
equipped bureaucrats then might run the business [World Bank, 1995]. Privatization
would, according to those authors, be beneficial for the efficiency of a company.5
These positive effects of private ownership should, however, not be overstated,
because managerial incentives with a separation of ownership and control depend also on
the availability of performance information to shareholders and on the potential force of
take-over mechanisms [Yarrow, 1986]. If there is no stock market in a developing
country both assumptions may not be valid. A stock market easily informs the
shareholders on the value of their shares, but in the absence of a stock exchange
accounting information might be needed to replace the information contained in the stock
prices. Because the management will make the accounting information itself, auditing
and evaluation procedures might be needed to check company value and managerial
performance. The monitoring of managers may thus become very costly.
But even if shareholders would be able to monitor the managers cheaply, they
may not act upon the information. In particular small shareholders may not be prepared to
incur the costs needed for disciplining managers. They may even try to get a 'free ride' as
they might correctly assume that large shareholders have more to gain from disciplining
managers. When there is an efficient market for corporate control, large shareholders
could overcome this problem by simply buying additional shares and then wresting the
control from the incumbent management. It will, however, be clear that such a market for
corporate control will be absent if there is no stock market.
Thus, although one could question whether state-owned enterprises should be
privatized indiscriminately, quite a number of authors find positive financial post-
privatization results [Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang, 1992; Ramamurti, 1997;
LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997; Pohl, Anderson, Claessens and Djankov, 1997;
Boubakri and Cosset, 1998]. The positive financial results may, however, come together
with reductions in employment. Positive financial post-privatization results are also found
for less developed (Non-OECD) countries [Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh,
1994]. Other authors find positive privatization results with some firms, but a negative
impact on others [Martin and Parker, 1995], or only positive results with viable firms
[Estrin, Gelb and Sing, 1995]. A third group of authors only find positive privatization6
results when special conditions are met, like large stakes owned by a bank [Claessens,
Djankov and Pohl, 1996] foreign ownership [Carlin and Aghion, 1996] or the entrance of
new human capital [Barberis, Boycko, Schleifer and Tsukanova, 1996].
Despite the mixed results, governments of many developing countries
have decided to privatize [Megginson and Netter, 2000]. Even if the efficiency
arguments do not tip the balance, the fact that governments of most developing
countries dearly need the proceeds of company sales might. When a country
decides on a privatization program the speed of privatization becomes relevant.
Some researchers advocate rapid privatization (a "Big Bang") and others favor
slow privatization (the "Gradualists").
The advocates of rapid transformation suggest that governments are much
better served if they simply divest as rapidly as possible [Murphy, Andrei and
Roberts, 1992; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996]. They argue that the gradual
approach to privatization would allow managers greater latitude to sabotage
reform, than would be possible with a fast divestment strategy.  Moreover, if
companies are slated for privatization but not actually sold, companies may deteriorate:
"Enterprises are living things, and deteriorate very quickly once they are "for
sale". It is imperative, therefore, not only to complete divestitures as quickly as
possible, but also to manage the business well in the interim. While a firm is for
sale, key employees doubt the firm's commitment to them, are less motivated, are
attracted to alternative employment….[and the] selling process is a distraction to
management, which is tempted to leave critical matters unattended because they
assume a new owner will take them in hand" Donaldson and Wagle [1995, p. 36].
On the other hand advocates of gradual transformation suggest that gains from hasty
privatization must be weighed against the social costs of speed like high unemployment
[Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Katz and Owen, 1993] and that speedy privatization can
result in poorly conceived privatization schemes [Ramamurti, 1999]. Therefore, even if7
privatization is adequate for a developing country, the question on how fast to privatize
remains to be decided upon.
3. Methodology
In order to identify the effects of a long privatization period, we studied the effects of the
privatization announcement in four different ways. First, we present the direct
privatization results in Eritrea. Then we show macro-economic developments before and
after the announcement of privatization in public and private companies. Thirdly, the
performance before and after the privatization announcement will be discussed in three
industries: beverages, footwear and leather, and textile. We selected the beverage industry
because it was the most profitable one and the textile industry because it generated the
highest losses. From the other industries we looked for an industry with a large number of
unsold companies. We then have chosen for the footwear and leather industry, because
the companies in that industry generally produced for private (or intercompany) markets,
while some of the food processing companies were producing large amounts of food for
the army. When considering the stressed situation with Ethiopia and the increased
demand for food products by the army, we expected that these companies would not
show the regular developments of a long privatization period. Within each of the selected
industries we have chosen the companies that were slated for privatization but not sold
(nor in the process of being sold) at the end of 1998 and we studied the development in
these companies per sector from the annual accounts. Accounting data measure the
financial success and failures of the firm and the changes in performance over time. We
evaluate the performance of the companies to be privatized in the three industries with
respect to operations, investments and financing for the years 1995-1996 respectively
1997-1998. This gave the financial results during two years before the privatization
announcement (end 1996) and the two years after the announcement.8
Fourthly, we show results of interviews with company managers. In the
privatization literature opinions of individual managers are often neglected. This may be
caused by the fact that managers are considered as agents of the state. If the state wants to
sell a company, the incumbent managers may not be needed for the future of the
company, and they may be dismissed when the company is sold. Nevertheless, if
privatization takes a long period of time, the incumbent managers are needed during the
transition period. Moreover, potential purchasers require future oriented business
evaluations [Bennell, 1997, p.1799] as well as information from the annual accounts. For
these reasons the elicitation of management knowledge may be more informative than
solely gathering information from annual accounts [Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko, 1996].
We, finally, interviewed managers, because we found in the previous section that
the proponents of rapid privatization not agreed in their ideas about managerial
incentives. Some of the authors assume that incumbent managers fear dismissal when the
company is sold and that they try to postpone privatization in order to keep their
positions. These authors implicitly suggest that managers are prepared to use social costs
for private benefits. Donaldson and Wagle [1995], at the other hand, think that key
employees will be less motivated when privatization takes time. Their suggestion is that
managers would like to move to companies where ownership is not in question and that
managers incur personal costs by staying with the company. We do not know of research
where managers were interviewed on the impact of a protracted privatization period and
on whether or not they would prefer their company to be privatized quickly. With our
study we hope to identify managers preferences.
Management opinions were collected via open interviews aimed at general,
financial, production and marketing managers. The managers interviewed were asked
what efforts were taken to improve company operations, investments, financing and how
the privatization policy was influencing their companies' operations. We intended to
interview four managers of each of the nine companies. Because four positions were not
filled and because one manager was not available during 3 visits, we interviewed in total9
31 managers. This gave a response rate of 86%. Further details of the research procedure
are described in Hailemariam (2001)
4. Privatization in Eritrea
Prior to 1975, Eritrea had a flourishing private industrial sector accounting for 40 % of
the industrial output of Ethiopia [GOE, 1994, p.4]. In 1975, the Marxist government of
Ethiopia adopted a command economic system and nationalized large manufacturing
enterprises. During the period 1975-1991 it neglected the factories and drained their
resources without giving necessary inputs to develop the industries. When in 1991 Eritrea
became independent, the new government adopted a free market policy to resuscitate the
economy.
The government of Eritrea began to sell small co-operative shops in 1992 and
returned nationalized houses and other buildings to their former owners. In 1995 the
Eritrean government issued proclamation No. 83/1995 for the establishment of the
National Agency for the Supervision and Privatization of Public Enterprises (NASPPE)
to reduce the number of public enterprises. The objectives of NASPPE are to privatize
public enterprises and to implement appropriate management policies in order to vitalize
productivity and to establish a competitive and conducive economic ambience in all
public enterprises [GOE, 1995, p.4]. At the end of 1996, the Board announced that 39 of
the publicly owned manufacturing enterprises should be privatized. The remaining state
owned enterprises were either liquidated or not offered for sale because the government
considered them as strategic.
The government has been using a direct sales method. Usually, companies are
advertised in local as well as international newspapers such as The Economist.
Enterprises are auctioned and investors bid for the companies. The Board evaluates the10
price offered and the business plans of investors regarding investments, technology
transfer and job creation and then makes its decision.
Table 1 shows the companies sold in each sector as well as the number of enterprises
owned by the state in June 1999 and some of the company characteristics.
_______________
Table 1 about here
_______________
Table 1 shows the direct consequences for the sale of 18 companies until June 1999. In
these companies 1,681 employees were employed, while 5,797 employees were with
companies still to be privatized. The Eritrean government raised 156.2 million Nakfa
from the sales of the enterprises out of which 52.7 million Nakfa (34% of the total value)
was received from the sale of Gash Cigarette Factory. The other 17 companies were sold
for 103.5 million Nakfa.  Table 1 also indicates that the enterprises sold are
relatively small and that relatively large manufacturing companies are still owned
by the state. The metal and wood products industry and the chemical industry
(soap factories) were privatized quickly. Food, textiles, leather and shoe and non-
metallic minerals (cement, and salt factories) industries were less easily
privatized. In fact, some of these companies have already been offered for sale
three or four times, but have yet not been sold.
We can conclude that the Eritrean government used the 'Big Bang'
approach in slating all the relevant companies for privatization at the same time,
but that the actual privatization process did take a long time for many large
companies. Though we will not study in depth all the reasons for the protracted
privatization period in these companies, some aspects may be mentioned. Firstly,
before slating the companies for privatization, the government asked consultants
to set a minimum price. However, because of toughened relations with foreign
countries (in particular Ethiopia) Eritrea became less attractive to foreign11
investors as was expected at the moment of fixing the minimum price. When in
the meantime that price is not reduced, foreign investors may not be found.
Secondly, as we will see in the next sections, when a company is not sold quickly,
it may deteriorate and in that case a fixed minimum price may also be too large
for potential investors. Thirdly, some investors were prepared to pay a reasonable
price, but then the business and/or social plans were not acceptable to the
government. The social aspects for the employees are of course very relevant, but
there may have been also other, more strategic, aspects that the government may
have taken into account. For example, rumors could be heard that the profitable
Asmara Brewery was a take-over target for a foreign company that wanted to
close down the Asmara Brewery in order to get rid of a nasty competitor. This
article will, however, not further address the reasons for the slow privatization
process, but it will aim at what happens when the privatization process is slow.
5. State- and Privately Owned Manufacturing Enterprises
In this section we compare the performance of state-owned and privately owned
manufacturing enterprises in Eritrea before and after the privatization announcement. We
use census data of the manufacturing enterprises employing 10 or more persons prepared
by the Eritrean Ministry of Trade and Industry (see table 2). This means that many
Eritrean companies are not taken into account in Table 2, because most private companies
have less than 10 employees.
_______________
Table 2 about here
_______________12
Table 2 indicates that the state-owned enterprises are a relatively large and have a major
economic impact in Eritrea, if the companies with more than 10 employees are
considered. The number of state-owned enterprises remained the same, while that of
private companies increased by 48 firms in 1997 in comparison to 1996. Though the time
base differs between Tables 1 and 2, we may conclude that the number of companies in
the private sector increased autonomously, because only 18 companies were privatized by
June 1999. The number of employees in the state-owned enterprises decreased by 970
persons in 1997 in comparison to 1996, while during the same period the number of
employees in privately owned companies increased by 2,537. Again the latter number is
higher than the number of employees that worked for privatized companies according to
Table 1.
Gross output of the state-owned enterprises decreased by 52 million Nakfa in
1997 compared to 1996, while in the same period that of privately owned firms increased
by 179 million Nakfa. Gross input in state-owned enterprises decreased by 13 million
Nakfa in 1997 in comparison to 1996, while during the same period that of privately
owned enterprises increased by 109 million Nakfa. The value added at factor cost in
state-owned enterprises decreased from 315 million Nakfa in 1996 to 270 million Nakfa
in 1997, while during the same period the value added of the private companies increased
from 37 million Nakfa to 103 million Nakfa.   Because the state-owned enterprises
performed worse than the private enterprises, while both types of companies are affected
by the same general economic circumstances, it is obvious that something went wrong
between 1996 and 1997 in state-owned enterprises; this was precisely the time when the
privatization program was announced.13
6. Financial Performance within Three Industries
In order to assess the impact of slow privatization, we compared the performance of
companies in three industries before the privatization announcement (1995 and 1996) and
after the privatization announcement (1997 and 1998). The companies studied had been
not yet privatized by the end of 1998. Within the Beverage industry we studied the
Asmara Brewery and the Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory. From the Footwear and
leather industry we studied four companies that were not privatized, namely Dahlack
Shoe Factory, Deluxe Shoe Factory, Keih Bahri Tannery and Asmara Pickling Tannery.
The companies from the textile industry studied were the Asmara Textile Factory, the
Eritrea Textile Factory and the Lalmba Sack Factory. A fourth company from the textile
industry was in the process of bidding and was therefore left out of the sample. We will
show the aggregate development in operations (Table 3) and in investment and finance
(Table 4). We will here only report on the aggregate development, but these
developments can in general lines also be found in individual companies (Hailemariam
and Von Eije, 2001).
_________________
Table 3 about here
________________
Table 3 shows that the companies to be privatized in the beverage industry dominate the
companies to be privatized in the other two industries with respect to the financial
variables. Sales and value added are highest in the beverage companies. Profits are also
highest in these companies. With respect to employment, the textile industry dominates
the other two industries. The high labor usage will undoubtedly have been contributing to
the losses in the textile industry.
After the privatization announcement the sales within all industries decreased.
Such a decrease was also found in value added and profits. Because in all industries the
profits declined more than the sales, the profit margin declined after the privatization14
announcement. Also the average employment declined in all industries, but most in the
textile companies to be privatized. The shakeout of labor after the privatization
announcement, however, did not improve the profit margin in the textile companies; it
declined by five percentage points. We may thus conclude that the operating performance
declined after the privatization announcement.
_________________
Table 4 about here
_________________
Table 4 shows that the average amount of total assets was reduced in the beverage
industry, but that it did not change much in the other two industries. Because the profits
declined fast, the return on assets declined in all industries after the privatization
announcement. Table 4 also shows the liability side of the balance sheet. The debt
decreased for the beverage industry because the government collected the dividends to be
paid for 1993-1996 in 1997 and this resulted in a reduction of debt to the government. It
may be noted that the changes in assets and debt resulted in a shortening of the balance
sheet: the decline in debt was almost equal to the decline in assets. The amount of debt
increased in the other two industries. In the footwear and leather industry, the debt to total
assets ratio increased by 8% mainly because the managers of Dahlack Shoe Factory
resorted to bank overdrafts when the NASPPE restricted the retention rate of profits to
20%. The other managers of the footwear and leather companies believed that the bank
interest rates were too high and they tried to finance their operations and working capital
with retained profits. The managers of the textile companies financed their operations and
working capital investments with government guaranteed bank overdrafts and the debt to
total assets ratio increased by 14%. We may conclude that the balance sheet information
is not positive: after the privatization announcement the assets declined in the beverage
industry, while the debt increased in the other two industries.15
7. Opinions of managers on privatization
In order to learn why the privatization announcement influenced operations, investment
and financing we interviewed managers on the relation between these aspects and
privatization. Moreover, we also asked them about their opinion on the privatization
process. A selection of their remarks can be found in Table 5.
_______________
Table 5 about here
_______________
Operations With respect to operations the managers claimed that the uncertainty during
the process of privatization affected the relationships with existing customers and that it
hindered the finding of new customers. When a manager tries to find new customers, the
organization is entering into a new contract to supply them, but there is always the
possibility that the new owner will not agree with the agreement already reached. The
tanneries, for instance, have been selling semi-finished leather to customers in Italy.
There is an option of selling finished leather there too. But because the companies are
going to be privatized, the company managers are not seeking to extend their network of
relationships.
The process of privatization also affects the purchase of materials and the
extension of trade credit. In Eritrea, the NASPPE restricted the amount of inventory to
three months of production. This guideline did not affect local purchases, but it created a
problem for foreign purchases. Some companies were buying stocks from foreign
countries on a six months basis, because it takes a long time until the goods are delivered.
Such restrictions on inventory inconvenienced the normal operations of companies. In
addition, the NASPPE ordered managers not to extend credit on sales, except for
government institutions. Even for government institutions the maximum was limited to
one month only. This credit policy did not affect companies in the beverage industry16
because they are selling mainly for cash, but it created a serious problem for the textile
and the footwear companies where a longer period of trade credit was usual.
Finally, the managers also complained that qualified employees were leaving the
company. The government was not adjusting the salary of the workers in the state-owned
enterprises in order to avoid leaving highly paid workers for the future owners. Though
the salary of the civil servants increased, no salary adjustment has been undertaken within
the companies to be privatized. The process of privatization, moreover, created
considerable uncertainty, and technical and other professional employees have been
leaving their jobs for more lucrative ones in the private sector. These experts are taking
with them the knowledge acquired in the companies over several years and after
privatization the companies will lack technicians and experienced senior managers. In
addition, the NASPPE has prevented companies from recruiting new personnel. Due to
this, several key positions in the enterprises such as heads of marketing (in Lalmba Sack
Factory, Deluxe Shoe Factory and in Alpha Food Products) and production (in Deluxe
Shoe Factory) are vacant. The Ministry of Trade and Industry in Eritrea also stopped the
custom of giving employee benefits in kind, i.e. company products and the employees are
complaining about this and it is affecting their morale.
Investment and financing The management interviews revealed that the meager
development of assets shown in the previous section (Table 4) is due to the fact that the
privatization process is hindering innovations and investments. According to the
managers nobody wanted to make a decision on the pretext that "the new buyer may not
want this". The NASPPE considered that the prospective buyer of the company should
decide on investments. The investment restriction was, according to the managers,
preventing companies from investing in the future. The government did not want to invest
money that might not be recovered from the sales price and there was also the fear that
higher prices for companies would deter potential buyers. In fact the government opted to
continue operating companies “as they are” until they could be sold.17
Since the government knows that it no longer wants to keep the companies to be
privatized, it does not permit investment in human resources. Training is a long-term
investment and since it will benefit future buyers, the government does not want to spend
money on training. The managers interviewed stated that there is a need to train people in
engineering and export marketing to improve the viability of the companies to be
privatized. However, the same managers also reported that the government does not want
to train employees and management. The lack of training due to the long process of
privatization is causing companies in Eritrea to incur costs. The management of Asmara
Brewery, for instance, installed new machinery, but due to the lack of trained manpower
in programmed logic computer systems, the company managers have to bring in
technicians from Germany to repair it, and for even minor problems they are paying first
class travel and high allowances.
According to the managers, the process of privatization also influenced the
financing of the companies. The government declared an 80% dividend payout due to
privatization on the assumption that companies did not need much money for short-term
investments. The managers at the other hand said that 20% of retained profits (if any) are
not enough to meet the companies’ operating and working capital needs. The government
was ‘milking’ the profitable companies, which were then encountering shortages of
money, and some companies thereupon resorted to bank borrowing despite the high
interest costs to be paid. Though the government does not want to sell cash-rich
companies, it can be difficult at the other hand to sell companies that have large amounts
of credit outstanding. Therefore the government has restricted the credit offered by the
firms too. Only government enterprises were allowed one-month payment terms.
Privatization process The qualitative interviews reveal that the slow privatization
process also negatively influences the governance of enterprises. The NASPPE did not
vest complete and real authority in managers. In addition, the slow privatization created
uncertainty and disengagement with employees and diminished future orientation.18
Employees became disinterested due to the privatization and were not certain of their
jobs; when the factory is to be sold there is no need of working hard or to plan for the
future. Once the government decided to sell companies, the government as owner cared
less about the companies. The managers interviewed stated that it seems as if there is no
owner. The managers further elaborated that the government as an owner does not help to
solve even minor problems. It also emerged that political appointees fill the board of
directors of NASPPE, rather than qualified managers. It was moreover understaffed and
under-funded. Due to this, there were many vacancies in the approved structure of the
NASPPE and even the director works only on a half-time basis.
To our amazement, the managers of the industries did not complain about the fact
that their company was slated for privatization. Actually, the managers supported the idea
that privatization would be good for the company and the country. These findings are
quite contrary to the general idea that privatization should be accomplished quickly to
avoid managers sabotaging the process in order to retain their perks and positions for as
long as possible. In fact the Eritrean managers prefer quick privatization. They are
government officials and they will retire or receive new (if not better) jobs when the
company will be privatized. Because the managers thus have a security basis, they prefer
the company to be privatized as soon as possible. Only without the severe privatization
restrictions they will be able to develop their and their company's full potential.
When the privatization process takes a long time, a weak privatization institution
and a disinterested government thus contribute to the destruction of value, rather than
enabling companies to become competitive and attractive.
8. Conclusions
Privatization is considered to be of the utmost importance for developing countries. It
helps to create efficiency within the country and within the companies. Moreover,19
privatization reduces government expenditure on loss making companies, while the
selling of profitable countries even adds cash to government budgets. However,
privatizing large state-owned enterprises in developing countries may take a long time. A
weak institutional framework, a low level of domestic savings, the absence of adequate
capital and stock markets and social as well as strategic considerations may reduce the
speed of privatization.
We studied the privatization case of Eritrea, where the privatization process
indeed took a long time. Within the privatization period the state-owned enterprises did
perform worse than the private sector companies. We also found that profitability
declined in the companies after they were slated for privatization, while the balance
sheets showed disinvestment or increased debt ratios. Moreover, employees became
disengaged and managers frustrated because investments were restricted, financing
curtailed and because the government as an owner did not show interest in a prospering
company. Finally, the privatizing agency could not add value to the companies for
various reasons. The case study of Eritrea thus provides evidence that a protracted
privatization period decreases the revenue to be generated at the time of sale because the
enterprises are neglected during the privatization process and because the institutional
environment reduces the ability of managers to create value. This makes the companies to
be privatized less attractive to buyers and the longer the process of privatization takes, the
less attractive the companies are becoming to potential buyers.
We are aware of the fact that the Eritrean example may not in all aspects be
relevant in other developing countries. The tense relations with Ethiopia and the lack of
attention by the NASPPE may apply only to Eritrea and this may have negatively biased
the findings. At the other hand, the full cooperation of Eritrean managers with the
privatization policy of the government cannot easily be found elsewhere and this may
give the Eritrean case a positive bias. Nevertheless, the observations of the previous two
paragraphs suggest a vicious circle in developing countries. Companies are not easily
privatized there, and therefore the privatization process takes time. This protracted20
duration of the privatization period decreases company value and this makes companies
again less apt for privatization. In the end the government may still be left with
enterprises to be privatized, but the quality of these enterprises has declined. This
downward spiraling phenomenon can (in analogy with the concept of the 'poverty trap')
be summarized with the term ‘privatization trap’.
If the 'privatization trap' also exists in other developing countries, it is a
dangerous phenomenon. Companies that are difficult to privatize will be even more
difficult to privatize if they are not sold directly. In a protracted privatization period the
prospective price to be paid for the company will decline and governments may have to
add more and more money in order to let the companies survive. The longer the time the
privatization process takes, the more value is destroyed. These findings suggest that the
process of privatization itself can endanger value creation. If governments of developing
countries strive for efficiency and a reduction of budget deficits by privatization, the
companies should be sold quickly after their privatization is announced.
These findings give also a nuance to the 'Big Bang' approach to privatization. In
Eritrea the government slated companies for privatization with a 'Big Bang'. It may have
been the government's intention to carry out quick privatizations after the announcement
was made. These quick privatizations, however, did not take place and the privatization
process took a long time. This means that it is not always wise to announce privatization
for all companies at the same time. Nobody is forcing governments to announce
privatizations for all companies in one blow. In fact, it seems wise to apply privatization
with discrimination and to consider the possibility that it may be better not to announce
privatization of some companies if there is reason to believe that the selling of that
individual company will take time. This, in fact, creates a paradox: the more urgent
privatization is for a company and a country, the more care has to be taken in announcing
the privatization of individual companies.
Our results suggest that slow privatization deteriorates individual companies, but
we were not able to disentangle the impact of a long privatization period from the impact21
of a weak functioning of the NASPPE. It would therefore be interesting to study whether
the deterioration of companies is also found in other developing countries where
privatization is difficult. Only in that case one might speak of the general phenomenon of
a privatization trap. Moreover, it would then be worthwhile to give measures of slow
privatization and to distinguish developing countries with a weak and a strong (if any)
privatization authority. It would then also be relevant to learn, whether companies that
were faced with slow privatization, will ever be privatized. Finally, it would be important
to know whether companies that are eventually sold are able to free themselves from the
consequences of the privatization trap (if it exists elsewhere) and whether they start to
flourish and to fulfil the ideals at which the privatization process was aiming.
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Table 1. Number and characteristics of manufacturing companies sold or still for
sale in various industries in Eritrea (June 1999)




# not sold # of
employees
Foods 1 62 5 5 849
Beverages 1 47 8.8 2 627
Tobacco & Matches 1 136 52.7 1 104
Textiles & Fibre 2 731 15.2 4 2,544
Leather & Shoe 1 121 5.4 4 964
Metal & Wood Products 8 365 36.4 2 109
Non-metallic Minerals - - 3 600
Chemicals 4 219 32.7 - -
Total 18 1,681 156.2 21 5,797
Source: information received on request from the NASPPE26
Table 2. Comparison of State and Privately Owned Manufacturing Enterprises with
10 or more employees by major indicators for 1996 and 1997 (Amounts in million
Nakfa).
State-Owned Enterprises Private Enterprises
Performance
Indicators
1996 1997 Change 1996 1997 Change
Number of
establishments
 46 46 0 111 159 48
Number of
Employees
  10,969 9,999 -970 2,385 4,922 2,537
Gross output 811 759 -52 111 290 179
Gross input 466 454 -13 70 179 109
Value added at
factor cost
315 270 -45 36 103 66
Source: State of Eritrea Ministry of Trade and Industry, Report on Census of Manufacturing
Establishments 1992-1997, Asmara, November 1998, p. 11, 13 and 14.
Notes:
1. Gross output includes revenue from sales plus revenue from other services or income
2. Gross input includes cost of materials and supplies used plus cost of fuel and electricity
    as well as cost of repairs and maintenance.
3. Value added at factor cost is computed as gross output - gross input - indirect
    taxes.
4. The number of state-owned enterprises (46) differs from the number of  companies in Table 1
(39), because two companies included in this Table are administrated by the Ministry of
Agriculture and two by the Ministry of Information (and not the Ministry of Industry and Trade).
Moreover, Table 1 does not take into account one company liquidated before June 1999 and two
companies that were not offered for sale.27
Table 3. Average annual operating performance and employment before (1995 and 1996) and after (1997 and 1998) the
privatization announcement (amounts in million Nakfa)
Beverage Industry
(2 companies)





































Before 141 106 73 558 52% 69 16 13 954 19% 57 -2 -5 3,335 -9%
After 134 93 52 501 39% 5
9
12 8 949 14% 40 -3 -6 2534 -14%
Change -7 -13 -21 -57 -13% -10 -4 -5 -5 -5% -17 -0 -0 -801 -5%
Source: annual accounts received on request from the companies.Information on some individual companies for longer time periods can be
found in Hailemariam (2001) and Hailemariam and Von Eije (2001)
Notes: 1. Sales are net of sales taxes. 2. Value added equals sales-cost of sales 3. The profit margin is (operating profit/sales) x 100%28
Table 4. Investment and Financing before (Average of 1995 and 1996) and after (Average of 1997 and 1998) the
privatization announcement  (amounts in million of Nakfa)
Beverage Industry
(2 companies)




























Before 169 43% 102 60% 70 19% 30 43% 55 -9% 62 113%
After 152 34%  83 55% 69 12% 37 53% 56 -10% 67 121%
Change -17 -9% -19 -5% -1 -7% +6 +10% +0 -1% +5 +8%
Source: annual accounts received on request from the companies. Information on some individual companies for longer time periods can be
found in Hailemariam (2001) and Hailemariam and Von Eije (2001)
Notes:  1. Return on assets (ROA) is (operating profits/total assets) x 100%. 2. Debt ratio is (total debt/total assets) x 100%. 3. Equity capital is
negative in the textile industry because the companies are owing equity capital to the government29
Table 5 A sample of quotes from managers on privatization in general
General Manager of Asmara Brewery
“Privatization has been the main constraint in upgrading machinery. The
Board of NASPPE does not allow long-term investment in machinery, except
minor investments that solve critical items that could stop company operations
such as spare-parts. We are not allowed to invest in expansion or upgrading.
We succeeded in implementing the first phase of renovation before the
privatization process started, but even though we have enough cash, the Board
has stopped our second phase, renovation of the Bottling Department, due to
the privatization process.”
and:
“We are not allowed to keep a large amount of stock and this is hampering
our production. The buyer is obliged to buy the stock at the time of
privatization. Therefore, in order to minimize the burden on the buyer, we
were restricted to a limited period of inventory. This restriction increases our
ordering costs and since our factory requires a large stock of malt, it creates a
problem.”
Financial Manager of Asmara Brewery
“Privatization is taking a long time. At present, since we are thinking that the
company will be privatized soon, we are not working under normal condition.
… If this situation goes on, the company will face problems.”
Financial Manager of Asmara Brewery
"At the moment privatization is taking a long time and this is becoming a
problem for various business decisions that we make.”
Marketing Manager of Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory
“Privatization does not help in long-term and future planing.30
Production Manager of the Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory
"People have become disinterested due to privatization. They say the factory will be
sold. So there is no need for working hard or for future planning.... The enterprises
management team used to meet monthly but now -since we heard that the company is
to be privatized- we never meet".
and:
“Due to the possibility of privatization, we are ordered not to keep large
quantities of inventory, but the process of ordering raw materials takes time.”
Marketing Manager of the Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory
"Privatization does not help in future planning. Also the people do not work on full
mentality and they do not have any vision at the moment because their future is not
secure."
Marketing Manager of Asmara Pickling Tannery
“The idea of thinking that the company will be sold tomorrow is affecting
management decisions. Nobody wants to make a decision on the pretext that
‘what if the new buyer does not want this’  and we are not planning our
activities. The privatization process is slowing purchase decisions, affecting
planning and personnel administration negatively. We are also not increasing
the salary of employees due to privatization.”
Production Manager of Keih Bahri Tannery
“It seems that the factory does not have an owner.”
Marketing manager of the Eritrean Textile factory
"To solve the problems that the company is facing, the privatization process
should be accelerated".